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PROPOSALS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN INDIANA
JAMES J. ROBINSON.*

The general assembly of the state of Indiana soon will convene in regular session. A part of its work will be to consider
proposals for the improvement of the administration of criminal
justice in Indiana. The purpose of this article is to set out
certain proposals which have been receiving the consideration
of lawyers, judges, prosecuting attorneys, and of other citizens
of Indiana and of other states. Many of these proposals have
been endorsed by the Committee on Criminal Procedure and
Judicial Administration of the National Crime Commission,'
by the Survey Committee of the Missouri Association for Criminal Justice,2 and by committees of the American Law Institute.3
The Indiana State Bar Association's Committee on Criminal
Jurisprudence, also, has endorsed many of these proposals, and
will submit appropriate bills to the legislature at the forth*See Biographical note, p. 256.
1 Hadley, Outline of Code of Criminal Procedure, (1926) XII American
Bar Association Journal, 690. The thirteen men participating in the
preparation of this Outline, under the chairmanship of Ex-Governor Herbert S. Hadley, of Missouri, included men with experience as governors,
attorneys general, prosecuting attorneys, judges, defense counsel and as
expert writers and teachers in the subject of criminal law and procedure.
2 Thompson, The Missouri Crime Survey, (1926) XII Amer. Bar Assn.
Jour., 626. Moley, Editor, The Missouri Crime Survey (1926). The legislature of Missouri meets in January, 1927. Popular subscriptions of about
$65,000 have been applied to a state-wide survey of the crime problem in
Missouri. The resulting collection of facts, figures and recommendations
will be placed before the legislature.
3 (1925) The American Law Institute Proceedings, Vol. III, pp. 144
to 154, 441 to 524. Hon. Herbert S. Hadley is active also in this work.
Professors William E. Mikell and Edwin R. Keedy, two leading authorities
on criminal law and procedure, are in charge of the Institute's work of
drafting a model code of criminal procedure. William Draper Lewis,
Director of the Institute, at the meeting of the Indiana State Bar Association, on July 9, 1926, described the work of the Institute on this subject.
(1926) Proceedings Indiana State Bar Association, II Indiana Law Journal, 68, 69.
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coming session. 4 The order in which these proposals are presented in this article is principally the order in which the present
constitutional and statutory provisions appear in Burns' Annotated Indiana Statutes, 1926.

I
Proposal Number One is an amendment to the Constitution
of Indiana (Article 1, Sec. 13; Sec. 65, Burns 1926) to give
the general assembly a limited power to modify the petit jury
system.
The present constitutional provision is: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a public trial
by an impartial jury * * *"
How does this provision work in practice? No attack is
intended upon the principle of the petit jury system. Until
some more practical method is developed for handling any questions of fact in criminal cases, we shall keep and use the petit
jury. But does the present system work so perfectly that it is
impossible for the general assembly to improve it? May it
not be advisable to give to the general assembly power to modify
the petit jury system as need appears?
As a precedent, we have the present provision of the constitution giving the general assembly the power to modify (or
abolish) the grand jury system. In the Constitutional Convention, in 1850-1851, there were many delegates who opposed
4 The Indiana State Bar Association, at its annual meeting at Michigan
City, on July 9, 1926, passed the following resolution: Resolved, that
the incoming president, as soon as may be, appoint a committee of such
number as in his judgment may seem fit, to draft a revision of the criminal
code of Indiana, or propose amendments thereto and submit the same to
the Board of Managers and, with the approval of the Board, submit the

same to the membership and present to the General Assembly for enactment as much thereof as may have the approval of a majority of the
membership and the approval of the Board. (1926) Proceedings of The
Indiana State Bar Association, II Ind. Law Journal, 85.
By the end of July, President William A. Pickens had appointed a com-

mittee of seven, which has been at work since that time.

The members

of this committee are: Judge James A. Collins, Chairman, Indianapolis;
George 0. Dix, Terre Haute; Frank H. Hatfield, Evansville; Joseph An-

drew, Lafayette; Judge Will M. Sparks, Rushville; Gus Condo, Marion;
and James J. Robinson, Bloomington. The committee is known as the committee on Criminal Jurisprudence. The committee's approval of certain
proposed amendments is indicated in this article. The committee asks the
opinion of the lawyers of Indiana upon each of these proposals. The proposals approved by the Board of Managers and by a majority of the bar
will be submitted to the General Assembly for enactment. Each lawyer of

Indiana will be asked to state his opinion on these proposals, somewhat
changed in some cases, and on other proposals, all of which, with a referendum ballot blank attached, will be distributed among the lawyers of the
state.
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the inclusion of this provision.5 But other delegates insisted
that the common law grand jury system was unnecessarily ponderous and costly, and that the assembly should have the power
to devise a cheaper and simpler and more speedy method of
starting criminal prosecutions than by indictment by a grand
jury of eighteen or twenty men, called in from their work to
deliberate, at the public expense, not only on serious crimes,
but even on trivial criminal charges. The convention finally
gave to the general assembly the power to modify or even to
abolish the grand jury system.
(Constitution of Indiana,
Article 7, Sec. 17; Sec. 184, Burns 1926). The general assembly
wisely has used this power so that the mere sworn statement
(affidavit) of an individual, approved by the prosecuting attorney, is sufficient for starting a criminal prosecution in all cases
except murder and treason; and the indictment charging these
two offenses, or any other offense, is now returned by a grand
jury composed not of eighteen or twenty members, but of only
six members, five of whom control the body. In this way
Indiana, seventy-five years ago, prepared to dispense with the
necessity generally for the ponderous grand jury indictment,
and with the later circuitous charge by information. Even
today twenty-four states and the federal government are bound
to the common law grand jury system substantially the same
as Indiana was bound seventy-five years ago.6 Ten states and
the federal government still have the twenty-three-juror grand
jury.7 Not until this year did New York state, for example,
venture toward the simplified Indiana system." No prosecuting
attorney, judge, lawyer, juror or taxpayer in Indiana today
would consider going back to the common law grand jury system, nor even to the information system. In fact, Proposal
G (1850) Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for
the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Indiana, 1850. The grand
jury proposals were bitterly and oratorically debated for many days on
the floor of the Convention. Delegate Hovey, of Posey, on October 24, 1850
(Report, p. 204) said, "The Grand Jury system is without a parallel in
the history of nations or of man. Kingdoms have been overthrown, empires
have mouldered into dust, but the Grand Jury, amid all the changes of
a thousand years, has stood as firm and immovable as the pyramids of
Egypt. Viewing it, sir, in this light, I am opposed to laying rude hands
upon it, and making hasty alterations." Another speaker referred to the
Grand Jury as "the palladium of our liberties."
03(1925) The American Law Institute Proceedings, p. 458.
7 (1925) The American Law Institute Proceedings, p. 458.
8 (1926) Laws of New York.
Chapter 721, Sec. 742. See Report of
Joint Legislative Committee on the Co-ordination of Civil and Criminal
Practice Acts, p. 22.
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Number Five in this article recommends further abandonment
of the old system by changing the present statute so it will
permit the filing of an affidavit even while the Grand Jury is
in session.
Now, in regard to our common law petit jury system, may
not the general assembly find in it some features which are
as ponderous and as costly, in money, in time, and in loss of
swift and sure effectiveness, as the common law grand jury
system was?
The present constitutional provision secures to the accused
in all criminal prosecutions on charges trivial or otherwise, the
right to trial by an impartial jury, which means trial by the
common law jury of twelve members, and also that all twelve
must agree on a verdict in order to acquit or to convict.9 The
courts hold that even if the defendant in a criminal case consents to be tried by a jury of less than twelve, and is found
guilty by such a jury, the defendant may thereupon appeal
to the Supreme Court and secure the reversal of the conviction.

10

The Proposal is to amend the present constitutional provision
by substantially the following provision: The general assembly
shall have the power to modify the petit jury system. To this
provision may be added the following constitutional limitations:
first, by providing that in all felony cases, a five-sixths verdict
(ten votes) shall be sufficient to convict or to acquit, except in
cases where death may be the penalty imposed, in which cases
the verdict must be unanimous; and, second, by providing that
in misdemeanor cases triable before a jury, the jury shall consist of six, and a five-sixths verdict (five votes) shall be sufficient to convict or to acquit.
Should the general assembly be empowered to abolish the
common law requirement that all the jurors must agree in order
to reach a verdict? Lawyers agree that the present unanimity
rule apparently very seldom in court causes a miscarriage of
justice. Very seldom does one juror unjustly or corruptly
obstruct justice in a criminal trial. At least that is the general
opinion of lawyers.
But the chief object of the criminal law is deterrence. Public
opinion holds that one reason for the failure of the criminal
law to do a better job of controlling criminals is that prospective
law-breakers have no fear of the criminal courts; that they do
9'Brown 'v. State, (1861) 16 Ind. 496; Sec. 2254 Burns (1926); Note in
American Ann. Cases, 1914 A872; Cooley, Constl. Limitations, (7th ed.)
pp. 456, 460.
10 Allen v. State, (1876) 54 Ind. 461.
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not expect to get caught; and that they do expect, should they
get caught, they would not be convicted.
Now, is there any sound basis for this state of public opinion?
We may do well at this point to take an inventory of the crime
situation in Indiana. Less than six thousand names appear on
the registers of all of Indiana's jails and penal institutions on
an average day in the year, according to the official Year Book.11
Many of these names are repeated, during each year, and during
successive years. Yet this small number is largely responsible
for an annual expenditure, by the three million people of
Indiana, in taxes paid out for penal and reformatory institutions, for police protection, and for handling criminal cases
in court, of more than six million dollars. And this amount
may be roughly, but conservatively, estimated at between onefifth and one-tenth of the total annual crime cost and crime
loss to the people of Indiana. For instance, almost three thousand automobiles are stolen each year; one condition which,
although about five-sixths of the cars are eventually recovered,
helps to swell the crime bill of the state. So we have a situation,
in this state, in which one person in each five hundred, as a
convicted prisoner, may be said to represent an expenditure
of one thousand dollars in taxes directly spent for penal purposes; and the total annual crime loss is estimated at from ten
dollars to twenty dollars for each man, woman and child in
the state.
These figures may indicate various things. First, to some
they indicate that we do not catch, and convict, and imprison a
very high proportion of our law breakers, and that our criminal
laws, therefore, do not deter many from crime. Second, to
some the figures indicate that, although in their opinion we do
imprison a high proportion of the law breakers, we make a
poor record in deterring and controlling this relatively small
number of chronic and repeating criminals. Such figures as
we have, therefore, do indicate that public sentiment has some
grounds for its opinion that prospective law breakers have
slight fear of our courts of law. Each of the proposals in this
article is designed to tighten up and speed up and make more
certain the action of our courts in doing justice in criminal
matters.
Now, as to the petit jury, while it is true that few cases are
known where one juror corruptly or unjustly obstructed justice
at the trial, what about the petit jury system as a deterrent
11 (1925) Year Book of the State of Indiana for the year 1925. Other
statistics in the same paragraph of the text are based upon the Year Book
compilations.
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outside the court room?

Is it not true that law breakers do

not greatly fear the petit jury? Why is it that, as a general
rule, although the prosecution is willing for the trial to be by
the judge alone, the accused nearly always asks for a jury,
especially if the evidence clearly shows guilt? Is not one reason
for the great waste of time and money in picking juries, the
fact that the accused frequently is trying to get at least one
man on the jury who, the accused hopes, will "hang" the jury?
How does defense counsel occasionally, even in a plain case of
guilt on a certain charge, try to cause the prosecutor to agree
to accept a plea of guilty to a less serious charge? Is it not
true that defense counsel accomplishes this result occasionally
by threatening to ask for a jury trial on the original charge,
with the result that the prosecutor compromises in order to
save the state the expense and uncertainty of a jury trial?
The jury should be no more of a threat to the state than to a
guilty defendant.
The truth is that the state now goes into a criminal trial,
even into a petty misdemeanor case, with jury odds of twelve to
one against the state and in favor of the defendant. The state
must win the affirmative vote of all twelve of the jurors. The
defense need get but one juror. At least, this is the way the
prospective law breaker argues. Then he goes ahead and breaks
the law; he murders, he robs, he rapes, he commits various
felonies and misdemeanors.
The proposed change would be fair to the state, and it might
help to deter the potential criminal. The proposal would also
be fair to the accused on trial. Under the present law, if the
state convinces only two jurors of defendant's guilt, the jury
"hangs," and the accused has to stand trial again. Under the
proposed provision, in such a case the accused would be
acquitted. And the state and the witnesses, as well as the
defendant, would thereby be spared the expense of another
trial, resulting from the "hung" jury.
The chief argument against modification is probably the contention that the state must exercise excessive caution for fear
an innocent man is convicted. However, this argument applies
especially to capital cases, and the proposal leaves the present
rule untouched in capital cases. In civil cases modifications of
the common law jury are common.
The rule of unanimity, as a general and universal rule, helps
to weaken the deterrent effect in criminal cases of the petit jury
system. The rule of unanimity failed under the Articles of
Confederation, and it is not in modern favor in any human
enterprise other than in the criminal court room. So, for our
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criminal court rooms, the general assembly might be able, if
empowered to do so, to work out modifications which would help
to make real our Constitution's guarantee of speedy and complete justice. Autocratic power in one juror in a criminal trial,
used either for the state or for the defendant, is just as dangerous, and just as likely to breed trouble, and just as undemocratic in principle as autocratic power anywhere else.
This proposal is endorsed by the Indiana State Bar Committee,
and in substance, by the National Crime Commission Committee. A few states have had similar provisions for several years.
There is no provision in the Constitution of the United States
conflicting with this proposal, nor with any other proposal set
12
out in this article.
II.
Proposal Number Two is an amendment to the Constitution
of Indiana (Article 1, Section 19; Sec. 178, Burns 1926) to end
the present view of the jury's powers as to the law. The present
provision is: "In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall
have the right to determine the law and the facts." The proposed amendment would strike out the section.
In civil cases in Indiana the jury determines the facts; the
judge determines the law. The practical experience and viewpoint of the juror are considered as his qualifications for answering questions of fact. The training and experience of the judge
are regarded as qualifying him to settle, for the jury, questions
of law. But in criminal cases, our constitutional provision, as
interpreted by our courts, gives to the jury the authority-if
not the capacity-to determine both questions of law and questions of fact. A layman may be surprised occasionally to hear
the defendant's lawyer in a criminal trial reading to the jury
from technical books of the law and asking the jury to consider
the statute under which the defendant is being prosecuted to
be unconstitutional, and therefore, to find the defendant not
guilty. Or sometimes counsel will argue that the statute is
bad and ought not to be enforced, asking the jury to nullify
an act of the legislature. Moreover, the court will be heard to
instruct the jury that they are to determine both the law and the
facts in the case. Every lawyer of criminal trial experience
knows how successfully able counsel for the defendant can confuse a jury, and raise so-called "reasonable doubts" on the law,
and sometimes "hang" the jury by arguing to this untrained tribunal difficult points of law. Indeed, cases are not unknown where
12

Burdick, Criminal Justice in America, (1925) XI Am. Bar Assn. Jour.,

510. Maxwell v. Dow, (1900)

176 U. S. 581.
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defense counsel knowingly has read overruled cases to the jury
and has represented them to be ruling cases. One objection
which is sometimes heard against the present provision is that,
under it, a defendant of wealth may hire a "battery" of the
ablest counsel to expound and argue the law to the jury, whereas
the defendant of no financial ability to employ such able counsel
gains no such advantage. The present rule, therefore, is charged
with promoting inequality before the law, and with making one
criminal law for the rich and another criminal law for the poor.
In favor of the present rule, some say that the rule is a "safety
valve," by which the jury may, "on general principles," free a
defendant who has violated a statute which ought not to be
enforced against him. But the jury may acquit on the facts
as arbitrarily as on the law. And in deserving cases, the judge
often has the power to prevent the inequitable application of a
law, by suspension of sentence, or otherwise. To ask for twelve
men the power to nullify the statutory enactments of the general
assembly is to open up a dangerous jurisdiction. For seventyfive years this provision has been throwing confusion into the
13
administration of criminal justice in Indiana.
The reasons for the provision are probably historical. It is
the opinion of Judge Ewbank, of the Supreme Court of Indiana,
that the provision was adopted from the law of England regarding criminal libel, and has been misinterpreted; that it was a
provision aimed against the judges' efforts to compel juries
to return special verdicts in libel cases, and really means: "In all
cases the jury shall have the right to apply the law to the facts
and to return a general verdict of guilty or not guilty." In
other words, the judge was to have full powers to tell the jury
what the law was, but the judge was not to be permitted merely
to ask the jury: "Did the defendant do this act?" and then
himself to proceed to find the defendant guilty or not guilty.
Another, and probably related, explanation is that the Indiana
constitutional convention, during the democratic years of 1850
and 1851, desired to protect the people against the government,
and also to reform the law and to simplify it so that any juror,
unaided, could understand it. Both of these reasons are now
clearly obsolete.
13 Col. Charles L. Jewett, of New Albany, in his address as President of
the Indiana State Bar Association, in 1906, spoke on "Our Code of Criminal

Procedure."

He characterizes this constitutional provision, as interpreted

by the courts, and as applied in the criminal trial practice, as "ridiculous,"
"absurd," and "comical." (1906) Report of Tenth Annual Meeting of State
Bar Association of Indiana, p. 10, at p. 14.
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The present provision, as interpreted, helps to paralyze the
trial judge, under the pains and penalties of reversal, if he
seems to encroach upon the jury's field of decision, even though
the jury need not pay any attention to what he says, and probably did not do so. The provision is hard to sustain, either on
grounds of reason, or of practical considerations, or of historical

origin.
This proposal is endorsed by the Indiana Bar Committee.
III.
Proposal Number Three is the repeal, in the Constitution of
Indiana, of Article 7, Section 21; Sec. 188, Burns 1926. This
would empower the general assembly and the courts to control
the admission and practice of lawyers at the bars of the respective courts.
The section now provides that "Every person of good moral
character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to practice law in all courts of justice."
The present provision has a historical basis, rather than a
legal or logical one. In 1850 and 1851, as shown by the minutes
of the debates of the constitutional convention, there was strong
public sentiment against lawyers, and a strong desire to reform
and to simplify the law, so that every man could be his own
lawyer. 14 Like the provision which was interpreted as allowing
the jury to determine the law in criminal cases, this provision
should be dropped, along with the other "Law Reform" schemes
which fell flat without simplifying the law in the complete
manner which was planned.
The present provision is misleading as to the actual professional standing of the Indiana bar. It is believed by many who
have observed the bar of other states where there are strict
requirements for admission, that the Indiana bar is not excelled
in such states. In fact, some of the most serious charges are
made against individual lawyers in certain large cities in states
where the examination requirements are very high. But such
considerations merely increase the responsibility of each member
of the Indiana Bar to work for a repeal of this section 21, probably at a special election, at which other amendments may be
considered. To meet the present and future necessities of the
profession and of the state, the repeal should be secured as soon
as possible. If the lawyers and courts of Indiana are to help
14 See (1926) 1 Ind. Law Jour. 209, "Admission to the Bar as Provided
for in the Indiana Constitutional Convention of 1850-1851," by present

writer.
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the people of the state to get better administration of criminal
justice, the legislature and the courts must have power to
determine and to control the chief officers of the courts of justice, the attorneys at their bars.
This proposal is endorsed by the Indiana State Bar Association and by its Committees on Jurisprudence and Law Reform,
on Legislation, and on Criminal Jurisprudence.
The rest of the proposals in this article deal, not with constitutional amendments, but with statutory changes.
IV
Proposal Four is the amendment by the legislature of certain
statutes (Secs. 2111, 2113, 11037 et al.) to place upon the defendant the burden of perfecting his appeal, and promptly, from a
conviction of crime in a justice of the peace court, city court, or
municipal court. This proposal is endorsed by the Indiana Bar
Committee.
At present, after conviction in such courts, the defendant
may take an appeal to the circuit court, or to the superior or
criminal court. All that the defendant has to do to take such
appeal is to file a small appeal bond in the lower court. By
statute the lower court, (but this often means the prosecuting
attorney), then has to prepare a transcript of the proceedings
and file this in the court to which appeal is taken. In practice,
in many counties, the filing of the appeal bond often means the
end of the case. Defendants often file the appeal bond, not because the conviction is erroneous, but with the expectation that
the busy prosecutor will fail to prepare the transcript and to
get the case set for trial in the higher court. And if the prosecutor, at his own expense of time and stenographic help, does
prepare the transcript and does get the case set for trial in
the higher court, the defendant, when the trial day eventually
comes, by permission of the court can dismiss his appeal and submit to the original judgment. In this way he has gained perhaps
several months of delay without cost to himself. On the other
hand, the prosecutor may refuse to perfect the appeal because he
sees that the cost will be disproportionately great to the state.
Again the defendant wins by evading the judgment against
him.15 It is estimated that many thousands of dollars in fines are
15 A typical case is one in which an automobile driver cut across the
left corner of an intersection at high speed and crashed into another car.
The violation of several motor vehicle laws was plain. Defendant's attorney
thereupon demanded jury trial in city court. For the trial of this misdemeanor case, twelve unwilling farmers and business men were brought
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thus lost to the state each year. But this cost to the state is small
when compared to the nullification of the deterrent effect of the
criminal law upon prospective law-breakers. The present law
helps to make it optional with the convicted defendant whether or
not he shall obey the court's judgment.
The amendments proposed would place upon the defendant
the responsibility for perfecting his appeal or causing it to be
perfected, as in appeals to the Supreme Court. A proposed
statute for effecting such amendment provides that the trial
court shall proceed to execute its judgment unless defendant
shall comply strictly and promptly with provisions prescribed
by the statute.
Such a statute would protect the rights of a defendant taking an appeal in good faith, and would also protect the interests
of the state, which are now frequently lost by default.
,V.
The fifth proposal is the amendment of Sec. 2150, Burns' 1926,
which reads as follows: "Prosecution by affidavit. All public
offenses, except treason and murder, may be prosecuted in the
circuit or criminal court, by affidavit filed in term time, in all
cases except when the grand jury is in session or a prosecution
by indictment or affidavit for the same offense is pending at the
time of the filing of such affidavit." The Indiana Bar Committee recommends an amendment of this section.
The present law, when a grand jury is in session, often promotes congestion in cases awaiting formal charges, and delays
the release under bond, or delays the trial, of arrested persons.
The grand jury's time may be so engrossed with a special investigation that it does not have time to pass upon the accumulating cases. The prosecuting attorney should be permitted to
file affidavits in these other cases. Merely because a grand jury
happens to be in session is no reason why the prosecution should
be tied down by the common law restrictions.
The amended section may be substantially as follows: "All
public offenses, except treason and murder, may be prosecuted
in the circuit or criminal court, by affidavit, filed at any time,
in and impaneled.

Several hours were consumed in hearing evidence from

several witnesses, followed by the arguments of counsel.

The jury readily

found the defendant guilty, and in view of her moderate financial circumstances, made the fine $1. Defendant's attorney thereupon filed an appeal
bond for an appeal to the circuit court. Rather than put the state and
the witnesses to the expense of another twelve-man jury trial in the
circuit court, the prosecutor refused to perfect the appeal, and the fine,

like hundreds of others, still stands uncollected in the court's record.

228 -

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

but, if not in term-time, only with the consent and approval of
the court, in all cases, except when an affidavit or indictment for
the same offense is pending."
VI
The Sixth Proposal is the amendment of Sections 2193 and
2194 of Burns 1926, and all related statutes which provide for
the forms and forfeiture and collection of criminal bonds. The
present procedure is technical, deceptive and difficult for the
state. If the state provides for the release on bond of those
charged with crime, the bond should be a bond, and should secure the state. Now "straw" bondsmen deceive the state at the
beginning of the proceedings; and the requirement that the
prosecutor, even after the forfeiture, must win a difficult suit
to collect the bond, often thwarts the state at the other end. The
annual loss to the state on uncollected bonds amounts to many
thousands of dollars, though in Indiana no record of the exact
amount is kept. The Missouri Crime Survey disclosed that in
Missouri, during a two-year period ending in 1924, forfeitures
of felony bonds totalled almost $300,000; that of this amount
$26,000 was reduced to judgment; and that about $1,500 was
actually collected. 1
In Chicago recently the state's attorney
stated in the newspapers that $5,000,000 in forfeited bail bonds
was being lost by the state by failure to collect.
The amendments would require that every bond be in writing
and be sworn to by the bondsmen under the penalties of perjury; that the bondsman in the written bond make full disclosure of his financial condition, describe his property, state
the amount of his debts and obligations including, by name and
amount, every other bond on which he is surety or principal;
and shall state also who, if anyone, has indemnified him, and
what collateral, if any, he has received, and from whom. The
bond shall be conditioned that in case the defendant should not
appear, the court shall thereupon declare the bond to be forfeited, and shall forthwith enter a rule nisi, and after notice
to bondsmen, may proceed to enter judgment on the bond
against the principal and sureties, and certify said judgment to the Clerk for record. Execution shall issue within ten
days after said judgment is entered, or in case of cash bail, the
clerk shall apply the same to satisfaction of the judgment, unless
within such ten days the bondsmen shall produce the defendant, pay all costs, and satisfy the court that defendant's absence
was not with their connivance.
16 Thompson, The Missouri Crime Survey, (1926)
626, 628.

XII A. B. A. Jour.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

This amendment in substance, is endorsed by the National
Crime Commission and by the Indiana Bar Committee. A similar provision is now the law in New York. (1926. Laws of
New York, Ch. 478, Sec. 595.) The provision marks a return
to a procedure like the common law procedure of estreat as
Blackstone describes it. 1 7

The present law is a fraud upon the

state. Criminals are repeatedly indicted and are repeatedly
released on bond, so that they continue to "walk the streets",
as the prosecutor of Marion County complains. Again the defendant with money gets the advantage of the criminal law, in
its bail provisions. Statutes should make plain that release
on bail is a privilege granted by the state under its constitution
and laws, and that the state's rights must be respected and will
be protected.
VII
The Seventh Proposal is the amendment of Section 2202 to
simplify the forms of indictments and affidavits. In Indiana,'5
as in Illinois"' and other states, the legislature has multiplied
statutes in an effort to simplify indictments, all to little effect.
Still prosecutors labor to draw indictments correctly; still defense counsel attack such indictments; still many hours in court
are consumed in arguing the technical sufficiency of indictments,
while jurors and witnesses wait; still two or three hundred words
of common law jargon are used to say what is usually more
clearly said in two or three dozen words; and even then the courts
of appeal occasionally are compelled to reverse convictions because of indictments in which the only fault is technical. This
question of overcoming technicalities aroused agitation in England lasting for years, and during a part of this time the English people were so angry at what they considered to be obstructive tactics of lawyers that many districts refused to elect lawyers to be their representatives in Parliament. But the English people have provided for a simplified indictment. It contains the title of the action, the name and statute numbers, if
any, of the crime charged, and a brief statement of the particulars of the offense. A bill of particulars may be required
of the prosecution whenever needed to make the charge more
clear to defendant. Forms are included in the English Act, and
17 4 Bi. Com. 253.
18 Burns' Ind. Stat. 1926, Secs. 2202 to 2208, 2214 to 2219, 2223 to 2225.
19 Joslyn, Ill. Crim. Law, Sec. 408. An Illinois form of indictment for
murder by shooting contains over 300 words. Joslyn, p. 586. An Indiana
form for same offense contains over 200 words. Ewbank, Ind. Cr. Law.,
Secs. 248, '741.
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rule-making powers are given to proper judicial bodies to be
exercised as needed. Liberal powers of amendment are provided.20
It has been suggested that such improvements in the United
States can be secured only by making their promotion "somebody's business," and that the states' attorneys general should
be empowered and equipped to formulate and propose needed
improvements in this respect. 21
This proposal for simplified indictments is endorsed by the
Indiana Bar Committee, by the National Crime Commission,
by the Missouri Association, and by the committees of the
American Law Institute.
VIII
The Eighth Proposal is to amend Sec. 2210, Burns 1926, to
allow the joining, in the same affidavit or indictment, of counts
or charges of more than one felony, or of more than one misdemeanor, or both counts of felony and counts charging misdemeanors, where all concern the same party or parties defendant and all arise out of, or are concerned with, the same
transaction. The statute would further provide that the state
would not be required to elect during the trial on which count
to proceed unless the court believed that unfair advantage would
be taken of the defendant unless such election were required.
The fundamental distinction between a felony and a misdemeanor in Indiana is merely a matter of the difference in punishment. By Sec. 2027, Burns 1926, felonies are all offenses
which are punishable by death or by imprisonment in the State
Prison, and misdemeanors all other offenses. If a criminal trial
is an investigation by the state to find out whether or not the
defendant committed offenses against the law of the state in a
certain single transaction or occurrence, why not avoid multiplicity of prosecutions by settling the whole question completely and economically in one trial? The English people have rea22
soned out the matter in that way.
20

Public General Statutes, 5 and 6, Geo. V. Ch. 90.

Indictments Act,

1915; Pub. Gen. Stats., 15 and 16, Geo. V. Ch. 86. Criminal Justice
Act, 1925.
21Wigmore, Technicality in Indictments, (1925) XVI Jour. Am. Inst.
Crim. Law and Criminology, 166.
22

See note 20.
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Ix
The Ninth Proposal is to amend Sections 2225, clause 10, in
case the Seventh Proposal herein is not followed by simplifying
the terminology of indictments. The clause now reads: "No
....
Tenth. For any other
indictment-shall-be--quasheddefect or imperfection which does not tend to the prejudice of
the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits." To
this provision add, these words: "including any omission of
words such as 'feloniously', 'unlawfully', and similar technical
terms. Provided that such words are not specifically stated in
the statute defining the offense; and provided sufficient facts
are stated to show that the act was criminal in its nature, or
to make it appear that the offense forbidden by the statute in
fact was committed". There is no sound reason why the legislature may not provide that such words may be omitted in such
cases without destroying the legal effect of the indictment. The
Indiana Bar Committee endorses this proposal.
X
The Tenth Proposal is to amend Sec. 2232 providing for the
arraignment of a defendant, by adding to the section these
words: "Provided that: the trial, judgment, or any other proceedings in the case, shall not be stayed, arrested, set aside, reversed or in any manner affected, by the failure of the record
to show an arraignment and plea or either of them, unless the
record shows that defendant before the trial objected to entering upon the trial for lack of such arraignment and plea, and
saved exceptions to the overruling of such objection."
Under the present law, the prosecutor or court may fail to
notice, before trial opens, that the written record does not show
that the defendant entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge.
Even though the defendant then proceeds in the trial to make
his defense and to act in every respect as though he has pleaded
not guilty, still, if the defendant is convicted, he may appeal to
the Supreme Court and the conviction will be reversed because
the record does not show such formal plea of "not guilty". This
state of the law frequently leads to some maneuvering by the
defense to get such an error into the record. At any rate every
competent defense lawyer is, of course, in protecting his client's
interests under the law as it is, alert to take legal advantage
of such flaw in the record. If the state neglects to care for its
own interests by legislation, no lawyer feels that he can be fair
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to his client if he overlooks such a flaw. Between 185823 and
192424 no less than eleven convictions have been reversed on
this ground. Individual members of the court, however, repeatedly have complained because they were compelled by authority to reverse the conviction on account of such technical
error 2 5 and have refused to establish such a precedent in justice
of the peace cases. 20 The United States Supreme court formerly
held to the present Indiana rule, 27 but that court has overruled

its previous rule, and now refuses to reverse because of such
omission. 28 The latter opinion condemns reversal upon such a
technical error and says that the defendant should be condemned,
and not rewarded, for proceeding to trial without plea and then
later claiming the advantage of such formal irregularity.
Lack of such a provision has cost the people of Indiana many
thousands of dollars in new trials in addition to the cost in loss
of respect for the criminal law each time that these reversals
occur. The proposal is endorsed by the Indiana Bar Committee.
XI
The Eleventh Proposal is the amendment of Section 2235, to
require a defendant filing his affidavit for change of judge to
file such affidavit at least ten days before the date set for trial.
This would prevent the abuse of this statute as a mere means
of delaying the trial. There is strong sentiment for additional
requirements that the defendant set out in his affidavit specific
facts showing the prejudice of the judge against him or against
his case; to require defendant also to file the affidavits of three
other affiants also setting forth facts showing such bias; to
permit the prosecuting attorney to file counter-affidavits; and
upon the issue so raised, the court shall exercise its discretion
in granting such change, and in the event of an adverse ruling,
the defendant may except to the ruling of the court and present
the same to the Supreme Court upon appeal by a separate bill
of exceptions. But it is believed by many that the bar would
not now approve the passage of such additional requirements.
Many lawyers state their belief that the present statute is
probably the most abused statute in the criminal code. As
23 MeJunkins v. State, (1858) 10 Ind. 140.
Andrews v. State, (1924) 196 Ind. 12.
9 Ind. App. 296. Rule condemned by Gavin,
J.; Bowen v. State, (1886) 108 Ind. 411. Dissent by Elliott, C. J.
26 Weir v. State, (1888) 115 Ind. 201.
Rule condemned by Zollars, J.
27 Crain v. U. S., (1896) 162 U. S. 625.
Peckham, J., dissenting opinion.
28 Garland v. State of Washington, (1914) 232 U. S. 642; 3 Foster Fed.
eral Practice (6 ed.) 2752; 16 C. J. 392.
24

25 Hatfield v. State, (1893)
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George 0. Dix, Esq., ex-president of the State Bar Association,
recently said, these affidavits often are false and are used merely
for delay. The present law gives any defendant the absolute
right, by filing his sworn statement that the judge is prejudiced
against him or his case, to "throw the judge off the bench".
It is a not uncommon occurrence in criminal courts for defendants to come into court on the date set for trial, and to file frivolous motions for continuances. These the judge overrules.
Then the defendants draw out previously prepared affidavits in
which the defendant states that he believes that the judge is
prejudiced against him or his case. If there is a rule of court
requiring that such affidavits be filed a certain number of days
before the trial, the affiant also states that he did not learn of
the prejudice in time to comply with the rule of court. When

proper application is made, the judge must grant

it.29

The

judge then has to delay the trial until a new judge can be agreed
upon by the state and the defendants, as provided by the statute. Defendants thereby secure delay, which is the great keystone principle of criminal defense, and the great factor in preventing the swift and sure justice which criminal law must
achieve if it accomplishes its object of deterrence from crime.
Trial is postponed. Witnesses and jurors again journey homeward, wondering why the law allows such perversion, and such
a reward to perjury.
The proposal will prevent the postponement of the trial for
delay. If the prejudice actually exists and is not discovered
until within ten days of the trial date, perhaps the burden
should be put on defendant to make a showing both of the prejudice and of its late discovery. But such late "discoveries" are
so rare, that it may not be wise to provide an exception for
them. And when it is clear that such an affidavit will not secure delay, the abuse of the change-of-judge affidavit will decline and perhaps cease.
If the abuse should continue, it would strengthen a considerable demand for a repeal or for the more drastic modification
of the statute. The statute is much more liberal to the defendant than the corresponding provisions in other states. The
state is given no right to file an affidavit for change of judge
on grounds of prejudice.
XII
The Twelfth Proposal is an amendment to Section 2239 to require defendant in a capital case, as in others, to file his motion
"0 Shaw v. State, (1925) 196 Ind. 39.
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for a change from the county five days before the date set for
trial, or later by permission of the court; to set up facts showing such prejudice; to file also the affidavits of three other competent affiants setting up such facts; to allow counter-affidavits
to be filed by the prosecuting attorney; and on the issue so
raised, to leave to the discretion of the court the granting of a
change of venue from the court in capital cases, the same as in
other cases, subject to review by the supreme court.
The reason for this proposal is to avoid the present practice
of taking changes of venue from the county in capital cases, not
because the prejudice actually exists, but in order to secure delay, and perhaps to profit from the demoralization which may
sometimes result to the state's case. The expenses of the state
and the inconveniences of the state's attorneys and of witnesses
are heavily increased. Delay is often secured. Congestion of
cases in outlying counties is sometimes achieved.
The abuse of claiming such change as an absolute right in
capital cases warrants the state in requiring defendants to
make a showing that such prejudice does exist, and leave the
matter to the reviewable discretion of the trial judge. The
sacrifice of thousands of dollars of taxpayers' money, and a
loss, by prospective murderers, of respect for the state's criminal law, is the price already levied by the present statute. No
loss to justice is probable under the amendment; in fact the
contrary is reasonably probable.
XIII.
The Thirteenth Proposal is an amendment to Section 2250, and
also a complementary amendment to Section 2251, to require
that affidavits for continuances be filed five days before the date
set for trial, or to sustain the burden of proving on the date
set for trial that the party could not have filed the affidavit before the date set for trial; and further to remove the requirement that the prosecuting attorney, or the defendant, in order
to avoid continuance, admit "the truth" of the facts which the
opposite party in his affidavit for continuance alleges that he
can prove by the absent witness. The amendment should provide that the prosecutor, or the defendant, admit that "the absent witness will testify to the facts as true" as in a civil case
(Sec. 438, Burns 1926) ; then give the other party the power
to impeach the witness as though the witness were present and
so testified. Some think a constitutional amendment of the confrontation clause would be necessary for this last clause.
The reason for this proposal is obvious. The present law
can not be supported by reason, and in practice it promotes
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dilatory continuances. The amendments place the same burden
on the state that they do on the defendant.
The proposal is endorsed by the Indiana Bar Committee, as to
the five-day limitation.
XIV
The Fourteenth proposal is an amendment to Sections 2255
and 2256 to reduce the number of peremptory challenges: in
capital cases from 20 to 10; in other felonies from 10 to 5; and
in other prosecutions to leave the number at 3. If the jury
commissioners will provide well-qualified jurors, there should
be no need of the present number of peremptory challenges;
that is, of challenges for which the challenger cannot assign one
of the fifteen statutory causes for challenge. A defect in our
procedure has been the waste of days or weeks in impaneling a
jury. Peremptory challenges help to kill this valuable time. Col.
Charles L. Jewett, in the address already referred to, twenty
years ago, urged the abolition of peremptory challenges, calling
them an "abomination." If the jury commissioners are not able
to submit respectable panels of jurors, statutory requirements
should fix qualifications for jurors.
This proposal is endorsed by the State Bar Committee.
XV
The Fifteenth Proposal is an amendment to Section 2257,
which states the causes for challenge, by omitting from the
Second clause the words "or reading reports of their testimony"
(the testimony of witnesses of the transaction) as ground for
challenge for cause. The mere fact that a juror has read a
newspaper account of a witness's testimony at a preliminary
hearing should be no absolute ground for challenge, if the juror,
on his oath, says he can act fairly and impartially according to
the evidence introduced at the trial. In these days of universal
reading of newspapers, it is becoming increasingly difficult to
impanel a jury under the present rule.
XVI
The Sixteenth Proposal also is to amend Section 2257, at
clause fifteen, to reduce the period of "twelve months immediately preceding the trial" to "six months immediately preceding
the trial" as cause for disqualifying a juror who is not a .member of the regular panel, for previous service on a jury. This
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clause was aimed at the professional juror. It has outlived its
usefulness, as most courts are no longer troubled by the professional juror. The rule is difficult of application, also, and frequently delays the trial while jury records covering a whole year
are being searched. However, there is a question as to the importance of this proposal and the preceding one.
XVII
The Seventeenth Proposal is an amendment to Section 2265
by adding a reciprocity clause, agreeing to send Indiana citizens into other states which will enact a reciprocal statute, for
service as witnesses in criminal cases. This statute is especially
valuable in border counties. Now, by stepping across the line
into another state a witness may evade process. Thereby criminal cases are lost or die. Corruption is encouraged by such a
condition. New York has had such a statute for some time, and
recently has extended its application to Canada, and other countries. (1926. New York Laws, Ch. 415; Sec. 618-a.)
This proposal is endorsed by the State Bar Committee.
XVIII
The Eighteenth proposal is important. It amends Section
2267, clause 4, by striking out all after the word "behalf", so
that it ends the present futile requirement that the jury shall
not consider the defendant's refusal to take the witness stand
in his own behalf. The amendment would also permit comment
by counsel and court upon such refusal. Under the present law a
defendant may exercise his constitutional privilege not to testify.
The abolition of the privilege is not suggested here, although
many think it does more harm than good. But everybody knows
that the jurors do consider such refusal as indicative of guilt.
They reason that an innocent defendant wants to testify. To
tell the jury not to consider defendant's refusal to testify for
himself is equivalent to asking the jurors to ignore their common sense. Moreover, both the court and the prosecuting attorney now must avoid any reference to such refusal before the
jury, on penalty of reversal. The prosecution may occasionally
evade this "taboo" by suggesting that "no evidence has come
from the defense in denial" of certain facts. Fiction and pretense characterize this whole situation, and the situation should
be changed to recognize truth and reality and public policy.
Public confidence may thus be strengthened. Ohio and New
Jersey permit reference to defendant's failure to testify. The
proposal is endorsed by the National Crime Commission, by the
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Missouri Survey, and by committees of the American Law Institute, as well as by the Indiana Bar Committee.
XIX
The Nineteenth Proposal is an amendment to Section 2274 to
give the state the same rights as the defendant now has in the
taking of depositions, perhaps limiting the right geographically
to the county. The defendant now may take the deposition of
any witness for the state, although the state has no such right,
until defendant has invoked it. The defendant is thereby said
by this statute to waive his "constitutional right to object to the
taking of depositions of witnesses by the state" so that the state
may then take the depositions of the defendant's witnesses.
But it is a question whether or not the proposal involves a constitutional right, so that a constitutional amendment (to Art.
1, Sec. 13) would be necessary.30 There is authority that defendant's constitutional right to meet the adverse witnesses face to
face is secured by providing that defendant shall be present at
the taking of the deposition, with full powers of cross-examination, face to face with the witness, at that time, and not necessarily at time of trial. However, a constitutional amendment
might be the safest procedure.
The great evil of the present rule is that state's witnesses are
often caused to disappear, or to "forget", or to change their
stories while waiting for the trial, or they may die while waiting. The state is as much entitled as is the defendant to get
these witnesses "on record", even though they were not witnesses before a grand jury, and to secure perpetuation of their
testimony, and to find out what the testimony of defendant's witnesses will be. This proposal would help to shorten trials, and
often to avert them altogether. Every legitimate right of the
defendant could be preserved, and the state's rights would be
upheld.
This proposal is endorsed by the State Bar Committee, and,
in substance, by the National Crime Commission Committee
(Their Section X).
XX
The Twentieth Proposal is to repeal Sec. 2300 which now gives
defendants jointly charged with felony the absolute right to
separate trials; and to enact this statute, proposed by the com30 West v. Louisiana, (1904) 194 U. S. 258; 15 A. L. R. 495, 501, 552.
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mittee of the National Crime Commission (their proposal No.
VIII) in the following words: Defendants charged with conspiracy or any other crime such as riot and affray, that require
joint action, shall be tried jointly, and all defendants jointly
charged by indictment or affidavit with crimes which may be
jointly committed but do not require joint action shall be jointly
tried unless in the opinion of the trial court, the interests of
justice require that one or more be tried separately. Or some
may prefer the new New York statute, in these words: Defendants, jointly indicted, may be tried separately or jointly in
the discretion of the court. (1926. Laws of New York, Chap.
461, Sec. 391.)
A provision should be added to prevent evasion of this proposed statute by the filing of separate motions for a change of
judge, in which case separate trials are secured. 3 1 Such a provision would be to amend Sec. 2235, or the proposed section,
or both, by providing that in case one or more defendants jointly
indicted with others, wish to file an affidavit for a change of
venue from the judge, all shall join in such affidavit and the
change shall be granted jointly and not separately. (Or discretion might be left in either judge.)
The present law puts a premium on wholesale crimes by
gangs. If a dozen bandits capture, terrorize and loot an Indiana
town, and are jointly indicted for the crime, and if each demands a separate trial, the present statute compels the court to
grant to each one a separate trial. Thus a second raid is made
upon the taxpayers of the community, who are forced to furnish a dozen different juries, and as witnesses to attend a dozen
different trials, repeating a dozen times the same testimony
about the same transaction. Some witnesses may be brought a
dozen times from great distances at public expense. One excuse for such a proceeding is that defendants of good reputation
would be prejudiced in a trial jointly with defendants of bad
reputation. Whenever such good reason appears, the court,
under the proposal, would grant separate trials for cause
shown.
This proposal is endorsed by the committees of the National
Crime Commission, of the Missouri Association, of the American Law Institute.
XXI.
The Twenty-first Proposal is to amend Section 2301, which
fixes the order of trial.

The amendment should be to make the

31 Neely v. State, (1924) 194 Ind. 667.
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order of the defendant's statement of his defense the same as in
a civil case (Section 584, Burns 1916). That would require defendant to make his statement just after the opening statement
by the prosecution or not at all. Now, the defendant may wait
until he hears the state's opening statement and evidence before
making an opening statement himself. The state is thereby
forced to introduce its evidence in ignorance of the line of defense, whereas the defendant does not have to decide whether
his defense will be alibi, or self-defense, or accident or something else, until after he has heard the state's evidence. Here
again the state is handicapped, and opportunity is given to the
defense to frame its defense at the trial, and still to get the
benefit of making a strong opening statement at the end of the
state's case, and as an introduction to the defendant's own case
in chief.
The last session of the New York legislature passed a similar
statute. (1926. Laws of New York, Chapter 417, Sec. 388.)
The State Bar Association endorses this proposal.
XXII
The Twenty-second Proposal is to amend the fourth clause
of Section 2301, which provides for the closing arguments in
criminal cases, by making the last sentence read as follows: "If
the defendant or his counsel refuses to argue the case after the
prosecuting attorney has made his opening argument, the prosecuting attorney shall then make his closing argument."
The State Bar Committee endorses this proposal.
The present provision is so unfair to the state and has helped
to cause so many miscarriages of criminal justice in Indiana
that it is here set out in full, as follows: If the defendant or his
counsel refuses to argue the case after the prosecuting attorney
has made his opening argument, that shall be the only argument allowed in the case.
How does this provision work in practice? At the end of a
criminal trial, the state, having the burden of proving the
charge, is entitled by the general rule to open and close the final
argument. This statute in effect may be used by defendants to
change that general rule. For the state, a good final argument
is often decisive. In it the state's attorney can summarize and
analyze the evidence, reconcile discrepancies in the state's case,
and point out flaws in the defendant's defense. In this way the
jury is helped to understand the state's position. If the object
of a trial is to help the untrained jury to get at the truth of the
dispute, no part of the trial is more valuable than the final argument for that purpose. Especially is this true where the rule of
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"reasonable doubt" has been kept uppermost in the minds of the
jury. In important cases where there are often two or three
lawyers on each side, the prosecution frequently saves its most
experienced and able counsel for the final closing argument. Picture the situation, therefore, when junior counsel opens for the
prosecution. At the end of his argument defense counsel can
say, "We waive argument for the defense". Often this is said
in a manner to indicate that the prosecution has really not made
a strong enough case to cause the defense to trouble to answer
it. As a matter of fact the defense frequently knows that the
jury is "up in the air", and that the state's able closing arguments would help to clear up the jury's "reasonable doubts."
Therefore the defense adopts "gag rule"; the state cannot even
point out to the jury what is very often the true situation,
namely, that the defendant's refusal to argue the case is a confession of weakness. Frequently this tactical strategy results
in an acquittal for a guilty defendant, or in a "hung jury"equally acceptable.
Why should not this absurd provision be taken out of the
statutes ?32
XXIII
The Twenty-third proposal is to add at the end of the first
sentence in Section 2302, which deals with "reasonable doubt,"
these words: "But the effect of this presumption of innocence
shall be only to place upon the state the burden of proving the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the court shall
so instruct the jury."
The committee of the National Crime Commission endorses
this proposal, in substance, and suggests that it is aimed against
the over-emphasis on the presumption of innocence in the decisions of a number of states. Frequently the impression arises
that Indiana juries are confused on this subject, and verdicts
are erroneous as a result. This provision would add clearness
and certainty to criminal trials. In this way work of great
authorities like Thayer and Wigmore would be put to greater
practical use in the interest of justice.
32 This is the same question with which Colonel Jewett closed his treatment of this provision in his address in 1906. He tells of the "ludicrous"
success with which he, as defense counsel, made use of this provision,
in a Crawford County "whitecap" case, tried before Judge Reinhard fifteen
years before. He shows how this, and similar "jokers," in the Indiana

criminal code, had led to so many miscarriages of criminal justice that citizens, in desperation, resorted to "whitecapping," and invoked the jurisdiction of "Judge Lynch."
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XXIV
The Twenty-fourth proposal is an amendment to sections 2252
and 2253 to refuse discharge because defendant has been under
indictment for three terms of court, without trial, unless defendant has requested the court to set his case for trial within one
year after arraignment, and three terms of court have elapsed
without trial after such request.
This also is an effort to place a little more responsibility, and
a little less honorary privilege, upon a criminal defendant. It
is the suggestion of an Indiana circuit judge, and has been approved by the State Bar Committee.
XXV
The Twenty-fifth Proposal is to amend the provision as to
stays of execution, Sections 2352 to 2355, so as to place in the
court which rendered the judgment the power not only to arrest
the defendant, but also to enter judgment for the amount of the
stay against the replevin bail, and to certify the same to the
clerk, who shall record the same as a lien on the judgment
debtor's property, and shall issue execution forthwith. And
the replevin bail agreement shall be so conditioned.
This provision is analogous to the prior recommendation
berein (Proposal VI) regarding appearance bonds. The same
arguments apply here which applied there. The state should
either stop taking replevin bail, or realize on it when forfeited.
It is estimated that the amounts now due and owing the state
of Indiana in unpaid fines, uncollected from the replevin bail,
amount to hundreds of thousands of dollars. Self-executing
provisions of this sort will decrease political interference, and
will add speed and certainty to this stage of criminal proceedings.
The State Bar Committee endorses this proposal.
XXVI
The Twenty-Sixth Proposal is to amend Section 2382, which
now gives one year after judgment or ruling on motion for new
trial within which an appeal may be taken, so that the statute
will give one hundred and eighty days for appeal.
A recent New York statute makes the time for taking appeals thirty days. (1926. Laws of New York, Chapter 416,
Section 521.)
Perhaps this proposal should recommend a
shorter period than six months.
The proposal is endorsed by the State Bar Committee.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

XXVII
The Twenty-seventh Proposal is to amend Sections 2383 to
2391, which govern the release of defendant on bail during appeal, so that in the case of a defendant who had been previously
convicted and imprisoned for felony, or twice convicted of misdemeanor, prior to the present conviction, the trial court
shall have discretion to refuse or to admit defendant to bail
pending appeal, if the court is satisfied that the present conviction is without error. Appeal to Supreme Court justice from
trial court's refusal of bail should be allowed.
This act would not apply to many people, but it would deter
those few who are following the policy of accumulating convictions, while remaining at liberty on bonds of appeal from each
successive conviction. It would help the court to protect society
from dangerous convicts. Bail is a privilege, and any state
which abuses its power to grant this privilege and thereby endangers the lives and property of its law-abiding element, deserves condemnation.
XXVIII
The Twenty-eighth Proposal is to add to Section 2394, which
requires the court of appeal to disregard technical errors, the
following provision: On hearing of an appeal a judgment of
conviction shall not be reversed on the ground of misdirection
of the jury or rejection of evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless after an examination of the
record before the court, the court shall be of the opinion that
the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
This addition will help to enforce the legislature's intention
as expressed in the present statute. It is endorsed by the committee of the National Crime Commission, and is substantially
the provision in the Constitution of California (Art. VI, Sec.
41/). It is directed against the peculiarly American doctrine
that all error in criminal cases is presumed to be prejudicial
error. However, some think it is already law in Indiana.
XXIX
The Twenty-ninth Proposal is to amend sections 7732 and
11839 which fix a prosecuting attorney's salary at $500 per year
plus fees; and to provide for prosecuting attorneys a reasonable
salary.
This fee system for payment of a prosecutor is absolutely
indefensible. On the floor of the Constitutional Convention seventy-five years ago it was severely denounced. It had been de-
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nounced before then and it has been denounced ever since. In
criminal trials today, defense lawyers occasionally are heard
saying "Gentlemen of the jury, this prosecuting attorney does
not believe my client is guilty. The prosecutor just brought
this prosecution to get the five dollar fee there is in it for him."
And convicted defendants pay their costs, and particularly the
prosecutor's fee, as though the prosecutor were a creature for
their bounty. The prosecutor's office is the key office in law enforcement. The Constitution should be amended (Art. 7, Sec.
11) so that the general assembly could provide that the prosecutor might hold office longer than two years, and might serve
a larger district than one judicial circuit, if the legislature so
provide. The office should be made more attractive in tenure,
and in salary.
This proposal is endorsed by the State Bar Committee.
xxx
Proposal Thirty amends Section 12355 which provides that
the convict's term shall commence from the day of his conviction and sentence.
In practice this section is being used today in this way. The
defendant is convicted, and appeals to the Supreme Court, and
is released on bond. Again he violates the law, is convicted, appeals to the Supreme Court, and is released on bond. Perhaps
there is a third and fourth conviction and appeal. Then, as the
appeals are decided, whenever there is a reversal, the defendant of course is still ahead of the game. Then, when a conviction is affirmed, the defendant dismisses his remaining appeals,
and under this section, serves all his standing sentences concurrently.
The section should be amended to provide that sentences imposed concurrently, or imposed subsequently but before the
serving of part or all of a sentence previously imposed, shall be
served successively in the order of their imposition, or in whatever order the court in its discretion shall determine.
This proposal is endorsed by the State Bar Committee.
Almost all of the thirty foregoing proposals have had the
special consideration and endorsement of one or more of the individual members of the State Bar Association's Committee on
Criminal Jurisprudence. Most of the proposals are endorsed
by that committee. Other propositions for the improvement of
the criminal law have been considered by the committee.
One proposition which the committee as a whole failed to
recommend is the proposal to restore to the judge his original
common law right to comment upon the evidence and upon the
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testimony and character of the witnesses. This right exists
in eight states and in the federal courts. The Committee of the
National Crime Commission especially recommends this proposal. Its advantages are clear but it has strong opposition.
Perhaps a requirement that such comment be reduced to writing before delivery and be reviewable, would overcome some part
of this opposition. The State Bar Committee endorses the plan
to establish a State Crime Commission, and a Central Identification Bureau. A study of the pardon problem, and suitable
legislation, are under consideration. The committee also expects to submit to the general assembly proposals for improving criminal law in other respects besides the procedural considerations.
The last considerable attempt of the people of Indiana to improve their criminal code was in 1905. The following year, Col.
Charles L. Jewett, as president of the State Bar Association of
Indiana, made the address at West Baden on "Our Code of Criminal Procedure". We have already referred to Col. Jewett's
sound recommendations. In this address, Col. Jewett pleaded
for the correction of seven of the abuses now set out in this
article, endorsing in substance or in principle the following proposals endorsed in this article: No. VII, XIII, XIV, XVIII, XIX,
XXII and XXVIII. In this address, Colonel Jewett said, "A disheartening feature of the situation is exhibited in the large portion of the Acts of 1905, taken up with criminal procedure. The
members of the codifying commission are my personal friends,
and therefore I say with regret that aside from acting as a capable committee on phraseology few things were done by this
commission which can give the slightest excuse for the enactment of its report into law, although it had a wonderful opportunity for good."
Almost twenty-two years have passed since that effort of 1905
to improve the administration of criminal justice in Indiana.
No similar effort has been made since then. There are many
who believe that the general assembly of 1927, also, has "a
wonderful opportunity for good"-an opportunity to help the
people of Indiana toward a criminal code which will be good,
and wise, and just. It is to be hoped that the members of this
general assembly will have such courage and such support from
the lawyers and the other citizens of Indiana that their work in
amendment of the criminal code will entitle them to the gratitude of the state.
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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE.
Since the foregoing article was sent to the printer, it has become advisable to add certain proposals to the preceding list of
thirty. These numbered additions will increase the completeness and definiteness of the referendum which the State Bar
Association will conduct.
XXXI
The thirty-first proposal is that the state shall pay witness
fees in criminal cases. At the present time, if the defendant is
not convicted, or if he is convicted but fails to pay the witness
fees which are taxed against him, the witnesses generally go
unpaid for their time and expense required by their obedience
to the state's subpoena. Critics call this a "dead-beat" policy
on the part of the state. New York and other states provide for
the payment of witness fees by the state. (New York code of
criminal procedure, secs. 616, 617.) The Indiana Bar committee recommends similar statutes.
XXXII
Attention has been called briefly to the proposal, especially
recommended by the National Crime Commission committee, by
the Missouri Survey Committee, and by committees of the American Law Institute, to restore to the trial judge his original,
common-law power to comment upon the evidence. The Indiana
State Bar committee does not include this proposal in its list of
recommendations. Most of the members of the committee are
not sure that the proposal is feasible at present in this state, at
least in the absence of certain supporting provisions which are
found in the Constitution and statutes of certain states having
this rule. The committee recognizes that to be the prevailing
sentiment of the bar in substance. However, the committee
would like to discover, in the forthcoming referendum, the opinion of the bar on the following modified proposal, to-wit: that
the trial judge be restored to his common-law powers to comment upon the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, provided that such comment be reduced to writing and submitted
to counsel before the argument, that such comment be reviewable on appeal, and that the court instruct the jury that the jury
is finally to determine the facts, regardless of the court's
comment.
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XXXIII

The creation of a non-salaried Indiana State Crime Commission is proposed. It is fundamental that a physician can not
prescribe intelligently for a patient unless the physician can find
out the facts of the patient's condition. Authoritative statistics
on crime in Indiana, as generally in the United States, are almost totally lacking. Improvement of certain existing evils
demands, as a condition precedent, the laborious and intelligent
collection of facts. The National Crime Commission recommends
that each state create its own crime commission. The Indiana
Bar committee concurs for Indiana in this recommendation, and
is investigating the procedure. It is believed that existing officials should largely make up the membership of this commission, including perhaps the secretary of state, the attorney general, wardens of penal institutions, statistical experts and legal
experts. Legislation may not be needed for realizing this
proposal.
XXXIV
The -Indiana Bar committee endorses the proposal to establish
a Central Criminal Identification Bureau.
XXXV
A proposal to modify the indeterminate sentence law by prescribing maximum determinate sentences for thirty-two of the
principal offenses, excluding murder and treason, is submitted
with the recommendation of an Indiana judge of wide experience.
XXXVI
From the same source comes the proposal to amend Sec. 2316
to provide that the age of admission to the Indiana Reformatory
be changed to read "from sixteen to twenty-five" instead of "between sixteen and thirty ;" that in felonies, except treason and
murder, if defendant is found to be between sixteen and twentyone, he shall be sentenced to the Reformatory; and if between
twenty-one and twenty-five, the court shall in its discretion sentence him to the Reformatory; if over twenty-five, sentence shall
be to the Prison.
XXXVII
Sections 2290 to 2296 might well be amended to enact, in substance, the recommendations of the National Crime Commission
committee, by providing that the Indiana procedure now prescribed for determining insanity at the time of the trial would
also be extended to provide for determining insanity at the time
of the commission of the act charged. The court would thereby
appoint disinterested experts to help the jury, in addition to the
experts paid by the state or the defense.

